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ABSTRAK
Setelah 20 tahun lebih Indonesia menjalani demokratisasi (1998–2020) banyak studi 
yang berkesimpulan bahwa demokrasi Indonesia setidaknya dalam lima tahun tera-
khir bukannya terkonsolidasi tapi sebaliknya mengalami kemunduran. Yang diyakini 
membuat kemunduran tersebut adalah meningkatnya intoleransi politik dalam masya-
rakat. Namun studi tentang toleransi politik Indonesia selama ini bias sehingga tidak 
menggambarkan kondisi toleransi umum yang sebenarnya. Tulisan ini menawarkan 
strategi baru yang tidak bias dalam studi toleransi politik, yakni strategi yang dise-
but “content-controlled measures of political tolerance.” Strategi ini telah digunakan 
dalam serangkaian survei opini publik nasional dalam periode yang cukup panjang 
(2004–2019) dan menjadi sumber data yang langka untuk tulisan ini. Hasilnya adalah 
sebuah temuan baru bahwa preferensi pada demokrasi, sebagai ukuran dari konso-
lidasi demokrasi pada tingkat sikap, tidak disertai dengan toleransi politik. Bahkan, 
toleransi politik memperlemah konsolidasi demokrasi. Ini merupakan sebuah gejala 
yang penulis sebut “sindrom demokrat intoleran”: preferensi pada demokrasi dihambat 
oleh toleransi politik, atau sebaliknya. Sindrom ini akan membuat demokrasi Indonesia 
sulit terkonsolidasi. Perlu studi lebih lanjut tentang sebab dari munculnya sindrom 
ini. Penulis menduga bahwa konstitusi sekarang secara sistematik ikut melahirkan 
sindrom tersebut.
Kata kunci: Konsolidasi demokrasi, toleransi politik, demokrat intoleran, konstitusi, 
Indonesia
ABSTRACT
Indonesia underwent democratization after more than 20 years (1998–2020), but 
many studies conclude that the country’s democracy is not consolidated and suffered 
a setback, at least in the last five years. An increase in political intolerance in society 
is believed to be the cause of this setback. However, studies on Indonesian political 
tolerance are biased and thus do not reflect actual conditions of general tolerance. This 
study offers a new unbiased strategy called “content-controlled measures of political 
tolerance” in the research on political tolerance. This strategy has been used in a series 
of national public opinion surveys for a relatively long period (2004–2019) and is a 
source of scarce data for this study. Results present a new finding that preference for 
democracy, as a measure of democratic consolidation at the attitudinal level, is not ac-
companied by political tolerance. In fact, political tolerance weakens the consolidation 
of democracy, which is a symptom of a condition that the author calls the “intolerant 
democrat syndrome.” In this syndrome, preference for democracy is hampered by 
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political tolerance and vice versa. This syndrome makes the consolidation of Indonesian 
democracy difficult. Further research on the causes of the emergence of this syndrome 
is necessary; however, the author suspects that the current constitution contributes 
systematically to this syndrome.
Keywords: Democratic consolidation, political tolerance, intolerant democrats, con-
stitution, Indonesia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v6i1.336
INTRODUCTION
Researchers with a strong interest in Indonesian politics pay close at-
tention to the country’s problem of democratic consolidation. If we 
follow the regular assessments made by the Freedom House yearly, we 
can observe that Indonesian democracy is generally not consolidated 
and shows signs of decline (Freedom House 2020). A number of studies 
present a similar conclusion (Hadiz 2017; Mietzner 2018; Warburton 
and Aspinall 2019; Aspinall et al. 2020).
By using freedom as a measure of a country’s conditions of democ-
racy, based on the Freedom House assessments for the period of 1998–
2005, Indonesia was a partially free country that became a completely 
free country in the period of 2006–2013 but reverted back to a partially 
free country at present. This finding means that Indonesia’s democracy 
suffered a setback in the past seven years. According to the Freedom 
House, the decline of freedom in Indonesia occurred in the component 
of civil liberties as a concept of freedom. Civil liberties considered to 
be experiencing a decline include state protection of minority groups, 
freedom of belief or religion, freedom of opinion, and freedom of the 
press. Furthermore, a setback can be observed in the state protection 
of freedom of association. This decline does not indicate the absence 
of religious freedom, protection of minority groups, and freedom of 
the press in the country. However, the present quality and intensity of 
such civil liberties seem to have decreased compared with those in the 
previous seven years. A number of prior studies show that Indonesia’s 
democracy experienced problems with consolidation after the stagnant 
2009 general elections, whereas other studies claim that Indonesia is 
9INTOLERANT DEMOCRAT SYNDROME
currently experiencing a setback (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010; Fealy 
2011; Liddle and Mujani 2013).
Indonesia perceives democracy in the sense that free and fair elec-
tions at the national and regional levels, which are conducted relatively 
peacefully and in an orderly manner, are possible. Freedom to compete 
for public office exists, and citizens are free to choose their leaders. 
However, democracy involves more than participation in elections or 
contestation of public offices. According to democratic theorist Robert 
Dahl, political participation is not a measure of progress toward de-
mocracy, and what actually determines the progress of democracy in a 
country is its citizens’ tolerance and ability to accept diversity (plural-
ism; Dahl 1971).
Political tolerance is not identical with   democracy but crucial in 
a country to make democracy function effectively (Sullivan, Piereson, 
and Marcus 1993, 5). The stronger the political tolerance in a country 
is, the better the democratic performance of the country is (Sullivan 
and Transue 1999). Dahl stated that political tolerance is an essential 
attitude for democratic stability (Dahl 1997, 36–38). Moreover, Almond 
and Verba argued that democracy should be a balance between active 
and passive sides to increase its maturity, where the active side involves 
political participation and the passive side involves confidence in po-
litical institutions (political trust) and political tolerance (Almond and 
Verba 1963). However, Dahl believed that political participation is not 
consistently related to democracy and expressed that “In the light of 
all this we cannot assume that an increase in political activity is always 
associated with an increase in polyarchy” (Dahl 1956, 89). To help de-
mocracy develop and mature, a culture of democracy or a civic culture 
is necessary in which political tolerance is a major component (Almond 
and Verba 1963).
Implementing political tolerance in ethnically and religiously plural 
societies is often difficult because ethnic and religious identities pen-
etrate people’s personalities from a very early period (Dahl 1971, 108). 
Historically, democracy emerged and developed in relatively homoge-
neous societies in terms of ethnicity and religious beliefs. Therefore, 
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implementing democracy is difficult for a pluralistic society (Dahl 1971, 
108).
Indonesia is a heterogeneous country, especially in terms of reli-
gion, race, ethnicity, and locality. Muslims are the majority (87%) but 
a considerably heterogeneous group, with some orthodox and others 
heterodox.1 Moreover, some Muslims tend to be literalists, whereas oth-
ers are rationalists or mystics. Furthermore, some groups are called 
santri, whereas others are referred to as abangan. (Geertz 1960; Pepin-
sky, Liddle, and Mujani 2018).
In terms of ethnicity, Indonesia is extremely diverse, and no ethnic 
group forms a majority. Javanese is the biggest ethnic group but does 
not constitute the absolute majority, at only approximately 42% of the 
total population (Badan Pusat Statistik 2010; Suryadinata, Arifin, and 
Ananta 2003). Therefore, ethnic and religious diversity is a major chal-
lenge for the growth and development of tolerance, which can impact 
democracy at a certain point. If developing tolerance is difficult owing 
to diversity, developing democracy will likewise be difficult.
First, this study examines the extent of democratic consolidation 
and political tolerance in Indonesia. Second, this study presents the 
results of the analysis on the relationship between political tolerance 
and democratic consolidation. Third, this study creates a typology of 
Indonesian groups from the perspective of the aforementioned rela-
tionship. For this reason, the concepts of consolidation and political 
tolerance are defined and measured in advance.
MEASUR EMENTS
According to Linz and Stepan, a democracy is considered consolidated 
if it exhibits the following three characteristics. 1) At the constitutional 
level, a democracy is consolidated if all stakeholders agree that dif-
ferences in interests are resolved according to a constitution built on 
universal human rights and democratic principles. 2) At the behavioral 
level, a consolidated democracy is achieved when no one group exerts 
1 See Badan Pusat Statistik (2010) for religious population in Indonesia.
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a significant force in society and acts against democratic principles and 
rules. 3) At the attitudinal level, a consolidated democracy is attained 
when the majority of the people demonstrate a preference for democ-
racy over other forms of government (Linz and Stepan 1996). This study 
is limited to only the third component of the democratic consolidation 
concept as conducted in numerous case studies of other countries (Foa 
and Mounk 2016; Inglehart 2016).
In studies on democracy and democratic consolidation at the indi-
vidual level, preference for a certain regime or form of government is 
measured by citizens’ answer to this question: Which of the three posi-
tions do you support? 1) Under certain circumstances, an undemocratic 
or authoritarian government is acceptable. 2) The form of government 
is not important, and neither a democracy nor an authoritarian govern-
ment makes a difference. 3) A democracy is the best form of govern-
ment despite its imperfections (Linz and Stepan 1996; Norris 1999). At 
the attitudinal level, a democracy is consolidated if a large majority of 
citizens believe that democracy, despite not being perfect, is the best 
form of government.
Meanwhile, tolerance is defined in this study as “the willingness to 
accept or tolerate someone or something, especially opinions or behav-
ior that you may not agree with, or people who are not like you” (Oxford 
Learner’s Dictionaries 2020). In political studies, tolerance is often cited 
as a “willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or opposes” 
(Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993, 2). In other words, tolerance is 
an attitude that allows people with different ideas and practices to enjoy 
equal rights as citizens. Furthermore, tolerance means respecting and 
considering humanity as a concept that is more important than any 
other ideal (Williams and Jackson 2015, 2). In other words, in this study, 
political tolerance essentially means accepting and recognizing the po-
litical rights of people as human beings regardless of their ideologies, 
beliefs, or backgrounds and social groups, including those considered to 
have extreme ideologies, those disliked by nearly the entire population, 
or those who aspire to destroy democracy. Examples of such groups are 
atheists, Aceh and/or Papua separatists, al-Qaeda jihadists, and commu-
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nists. However, despite the strong dislike of people for such groups, their 
political rights must be recognized, and members should be treated 
equally as human beings. An individual with intentions to change a 
nation state into a khilafah or to replace democracy with a theocracy is 
a human being nonetheless. Thus, their right to think, argue, aspire, 
and act to attain their goals should also be recognized. Moreover, they 
must be given opportunities to convince the public of their beliefs and 
ideologies. If their actions involve coercion and violence and/or damage 
property or injure or kill people, they must be judged and convicted as a 
criminal. If such an attitude exists in a country, that country embraces 
political tolerance and vice versa.
In this study, political tolerance is interpreted and measured by rep-
licating the study of Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, which has become 
the standard in research on political tolerance in the modern world 
(Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993). The measurement strategy pre-
sented in the research, which is called “content-controlled measures of 
political tolerance,” is the most realistic and objective for measuring 
political tolerance. This method is an alternative to the previous mea-
surement method, which is considered biased against certain groups 
in society. The old measurement strategy is not objective or neutral; 
thus, results are biased and do not measure actual political tolerance. 
An example is the response to the question, “whether you as a Muslim 
object to Christians running to become regents.” This measurement 
is biased against certain religious groups, despite religious differences 
not being the most important issue for determining whether or not a 
person is tolerant. Does an answer of “no objection” indicate tolerance? 
Conversely, does an answer of “objection” indicate intolerance?
Given that religious differences are not necessarily a major problem 
or issue for everyone, bias against one group does not indicate a problem 
of intolerance Therefore, the “object,” “content,” or “target” of tolerance 
must be controlled such that it is not biased against certain groups. For 
Person A, the target of tolerance may be a certain religious group. For 
Person B, the target may be an atheist, whereas for Person C it might 
be sexual orientation. Thus, targets of tolerance are very diverse. What 
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is tolerated by Person A is not necessarily what is tolerated by Person B. 
Thus, an objective and realistic measurement is one that can accom-
modate the diversity of the tolerance target. Such a measurement can 
be attained by making the target of tolerance as inclusive or open as 
possible. If the proposed alternatives do not include the most important 
groups to be tolerated, the respondent is asked to identify a group on 
their own. If the respondent thinks that no target group of tolerance 
exists, they are not forced to choose an answer of their least preferred 
group to be the target of tolerance or intolerance.
A political tolerance measurement with controlled tolerance targets 
makes the measurement inclusive and measures actual political toler-
ance over time. For example, if a Muslim is asked whether they object 
to a Christian making a speech in their neighborhood, if the answer is 
“yes,” let this response indicate “intolerance.” The following year, the 
same question is asked to the same person, and if their answer changes 
to “no,” does it indicate that the person is now tolerant based on the 
two different answers? The answer is not necessarily because the target 
of intolerance may have changed and is no longer the Christian who 
gave a speech in that neighborhood. Perhaps in the following year, the 
target of intolerance became a member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) community, which was not an issue the previous 
year and thus was beyond the scope of the respondents’ attention when 
they were asked the question. For example, if the respondent is against 
an LGBT parade in their neighborhood but does not mind the speech 
made by the Christian, they remain intolerant owing to their inability 
to accept the political rights of the members of the LGBT community 
or people with similar backgrounds. In other words, the target of toler-
ance has merely changed. The target of tolerance/intolerance is less 
important than the fact that tolerance/intolerance exists, regardless of 
its focus. This inclusive measurement method in terms of target of 
tolerance is not biased against certain groups and thus represents the 
value of tolerance. Moreover, the measurement describes the attitude 
of tolerance or intolerance effectively, as the target can be changed and 
is not a fixed measurement.
14 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 6, NO. 1, AUGUST 2020
In this study, the measurement of political tolerance is obtained 
from Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1993) and modified for the In-
donesian context, as follows2:
Often or common in a society, people do not like certain groups, 
and may express their dislike in a variety of ways. Maybe there is a 
group someone disliked the most from many. You may know enough 
or have heard the following groups in the community. Which of 
them is the one you dislike the most? If there is none, is there a 
group in the community that you most dislike that is not on the list? 
If there is one, please state the name, and I will note it.
List of the groups in the community: (1) Communist Party of In-
donesia, (2) Christians, (3) Catholics, (4) Hindus, (5) Buddhists, (6) 
Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), (7) Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 
(8) Shia, (9) Ahmadiyya, (9) Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
(10) Chinese, (11) Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
people, (12) other groups (please specify)…or (13) there is no group 
that is most disliked.3
The respondents who choose one of the most disliked groups are given 
a number of questions related to the political rights of the members of 
such groups as citizens. In this study, a citizen’s three political rights 
are their right to become a public officer, such as a regent, governor, or 
president; right to become a public-school teacher; and right to march 
in a neighborhood. To measure their level of tolerance, the respondents 
2 In the context of American society, based on expert assessments, Sullivan, Piereson, and 
Marcus listed groups that may be selected as the most disliked as targets of tolerance or intoler-
ance. The list of options includes “I don’t know which group is most disliked” (can’t decide), 
“other groups that are not listed here” (fill in the name of the group below…), socialists, fascists, 
communists, the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, the Black Panthers, the Symbionese 
Liberation Army, atheists, proabortionists, or antiabortionists (pro-lifers; Sullivan, Piereson, 
Marcus 1993, 81).
3 In each survey, the questions are accompanied by alternative semi open answers to inclusively 
accommodate the diversity of possible responses. The list of potential groups as the most disliked 
groups is updated according to the development of national issues. For example, in the 2004 
survey, ISIS was not included in the list because ISIS had not risen to power at the time. How-
ever, the respondents are encouraged to identify groups not mentioned in the questionnaire.
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are asked whether they agree or disagree to their disliked individual 
carrying out their political rights.4
The measure of Indonesian political tolerance in previous studies 
relies extensively on measurement strategies that are biased against cer-
tain groups, especially Muslims and their attitude toward non-Muslims, 
such as Christians, Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists (Mietzner and 
Muhtadi 2018; Menchik and Pepinsky 2018; Mujani 2019). This short-
coming does not indicate that the previous approach is useless but that 
it does not describe the actual state of political tolerance in society. If 
you are a Muslim and tolerant of a Christian being a member of the 
House of Representatives, does it mean that you are politically tolerant? 
Your tolerance for Christians does not necessarily mean that you are a 
politically tolerant individual. The real question is as follows: are you 
tolerant toward people with different backgrounds filling the mentioned 
position, such as an atheist or a member of ISIS? If not, you are con-
sidered intolerant because you do not recognize the political rights of 
an individual who is an atheist or a member of ISIS, despite tolerating 
Christians. This study tries to approach the signs of political tolerance 
toward certain groups in an unbiased manner.
R ESEA RCH METHODS A ND DATA
Similar to most studies on political tolerance and democracy, this re-
search relies on citizens’ attitudes collected through public opinion sur-
veys. A series of national public opinion surveys were conducted from 
2004 to 2019, and the population of these surveys is adult Indonesians 
aged 17 years or older or married. To represent the characteristics of the 
national population, the respondents or samples for these surveys are 
selected using probability sampling. Appendix 1 provides a complete 
explanation of the survey methods and data.
4 In the survey, the questions are as follows: Do you strongly agree, agree, not have an opinion, 
disagree, or strongly disagree that your most disliked person can 1) become a public official, 2) 
teach in a state school, and 3) hold a parade in the area where you live? The respondents who 
answered “do not know” are categorized as “do not have an opinion.” 
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FINDINGS
Democratic Consolidation
Democratic consolidation at the attitudinal level refers to whether citi-
zens view democracy as the best form of government for their country 
compared with other forms.5 Other measurements pay attention to the 
extent to which citizens agree or disagree that democracy is the best 
government system despite its imperfections. Citizens who agree or 
strongly agree with this idea indicate that democracy is consolidated at 
the individual attitudinal level. If a large majority of the citizens of a 
country show a preference for democracy, democracy is consolidated at 
the level of the country’s attitude (Linz and Stepan 1996).
Within a period of 2004–2019 the national population generally 
agreed that democracy is the best form of government despite its imper-
fections. This attitude was 87.6% in 2004 but dropped to 78% in 2010. 
However, the majority had a positive view of democracy. The questions 
were changed in the 2013 and subsequent surveys. Specifically, citizens 
were asked to choose between three choices: preference for democracy 
or nondemocracy or no preference. Despite the change in this ques-
tion, the majority of the citizens selected the view that democracy is 
the best form of government despite its imperfections. In 2013 survey, 
58.1% of the respondents preferred democracy, and in the last survey, 
which was in 2019, 78.1% of the respondents favored this preference. 
Moreover, less positive assessments toward nondemocratic or authoritar-
ian systems are observed. In addition, remarkably few respondents who 
are not concerned about the form of government, whether a democracy 
5 In the surveys, the questions differed. In the 2004–2010 survey, the question is as follows: 
“How much do you agree or disagree with the view that democracy compared with other forms 
of government is the best?” The choices are “strongly agree,” “agree,” “do not know or have no 
opinion,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree.” Answering “agree” or “strongly agree” means that the 
respondent prefers democracy. In the next survey, the question is, “Which of the three views do 
you support? 1. Under certain circumstances, a nondemocratic government system is acceptable. 
2. It doesn’t matter what the form of government is. Neither a democracy nor a nondemocracy 
makes any difference. 3. Although it is not perfect, a democracy is the best compared with other 
forms of government.” Choosing number 3 indicates preference for democracy. Given that the 
form of the survey questions in the two periods differs, the results cannot be compared directly 
but are adequate to determine whether the citizens’ responses are within the range supporting 
or preferring democracy.
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or a nondemocracy (Table 1), are observed. According to Linz and 
Stepan, the large proportion of the majority considering democracy as 
the best political system is a sign that democracy is consolidated at the 
level of the citizens (Linz and Stepan 1996). The large proportion of 
preference for democracy demonstrates that Indonesian democracy is 
consolidated at the attitudinal level. This finding is only one aspect of 
democratic consolidation. Other aspects, specifically, the constitutional 
and behavioral aspects, are also very important. However, separate stud-
ies are required to measure such dimensions.
Table 1. Trend of Citizens’ Preference for Democracy versus Other Regimes, 2004–2019 (%)
Democracy is the best 
system (preference 
for democracy)
Year
N
Disagree/
strongly 
disagree
Do not 
know
Agree/ 
strongly 
agree 
Total
2004 1183 2,3 10,1 87,6 100.0
2007 1240 4,4 10,6 85,0 100.0
2010 1320 4,8 17,2 78,0 100.0
Nondemocracy/ 
authoritarianism 
is acceptable 
Makes no 
difference
 Democracy 
is the best 
system
2013 1220 12,3 29,5 58,1 100.0
2017 1556 6,1 19,9 74,0 100.0
2018 2119 6,9 21,7 71,4 100.0
2019 2285 5,9 16,0 78,1 100.0
This study examines the relationship between democratic consolidation 
and political tolerance. Democratic consolidation at the attitudinal di-
mension shows that Indonesia’s democracy is consolidated. However, is 
this finding supported by political tolerance? How far is attitude toward 
democracy related to political tolerance? If the relationship between the 
two concepts is positive, democracy is accompanied by tolerance, there-
by strengthening democracy. Conversely, if the relationship between the 
two concepts is negative, Indonesian democracy is not distributed or 
accompanied by political tolerance. If this situation occurs, Indonesia’s 
democracy consolidation will be fragile. In fact, Indonesian democracy 
is currently experiencing consolidation difficulties.
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Political Tolerance
Before the relationship between individual preference for democracy 
and political tolerance is identified, the number of citizens naming a 
group or groups in society they like the least should be determined. 
Next, how tolerant Indonesian citizens are in terms of political aspects 
toward their least-liked group or groups is determined by the question, 
“How far would you ‘allow’ people from your least-liked group or groups 
to have political rights as citizens?” For example, if a respondent men-
tions LGBT individuals as the people they dislike most, would they 
allow LGBT individuals to run for parliament? On one hand, if they al-
low this situation to occur despite stating their dislike for LGBT groups, 
they are a politically tolerant person. On the other hand, if they do not 
allow this situation to occur, they are an intolerant citizen because they 
are obstructing the political rights of other citizens who are part of the 
LGBT community.
In the series of surveys conducted over 15 years, a majority of the 
Indonesian citizens identify a group or groups in society they dislike 
most. However, the majority’s attitudes fluctuated considerably during 
the 2004–2019 period. In the surveys from 2004 to 2007, the percent-
age of the respondents who most disliked a group or groups in the 
community was very high, reaching 81%. However, this percentage 
declined significantly to 58.1% in 2010 and dropped to 51.9% in 2013. 
In the 2017–2019 survey, this percentage increased once again. In the 
last survey (2019), the percentage rose to 80.5% or to the figure during 
the past 15 years (2004; Figure 1).
Which group in society is least liked? Numerous groups, identities, 
or organizations exist in a community, which change from time to 
time. Therefore, the choices should be as broad and free as possible to 
determine the most disliked target group. The list of groups presented 
in each survey is based on the assessment of well-informed persons on 
groups potentially referred to as least-liked groups owing to historical 
and political reasons, state ideologies, beliefs, traditions, norms, and the 
opinions that people hold and developed in society. The groups should 
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be updated consistently according to time periods or the changing opin-
ions of society, especially those discussed by mass media.
Figure 1. Trend of Existence of Least-liked Groups in Society (%)
Similar to the question raised in the previous section, the groups vary 
in terms of sociopolitical backgrounds, namely, the Communist Party of 
Indonesia (PKI), the Darul Islam or Islamic State of Indonesia (DI/NII), 
the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), 
ISIS, the Chinese, Christians, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists, Judaism, 
Ahmadiyya and Shia, the LGBT community, and other groups. Groups 
most likely to become the target of dislike can also change from time 
to time based on sociopolitical developments in society. Observations 
should be as inclusive as possible from time to time to provide a basis 
for measuring the general level of tolerance in society.
Among these groups, the PKI is often mentioned as the least-liked 
group, despite percentages decreasing in subsequent surveys. In the 
2004 survey, 70.9% of the citizens named the PKI as their least-liked 
20 JURNAL POLITIK, VOL. 6, NO. 1, AUGUST 2020
group. This percentage declined steadily to 14% in the 2019 survey. 
After the PKI or communists, Jews were often identified as the least-
liked group, though percentages fluctuated. The Christians followed 
the Jews, but percentages were relatively small and tended to be stable 
(Figure 2). The other groups, which were numerous, were chosen less 
frequently.
Until 2013, no new groups with the potential to become the least 
liked were added based on public opinion. Opinions on the LGBT com-
munity appear only in the 2017 survey, and news concerning political 
movements abroad was quite dominant, drawing public attention at 
home, especially on ISIS. The PKI or communists also remain a public 
issue, especially before the two presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 
and presently (Mansur 2020).
In the 2017 and subsequent surveys, a considerable number of re-
spondents mentioned ISIS and the LGBT community as their least-
liked groups, which were named more than the PKI. In the 2017–2019 
surveys, ISIS was named more than the PKI as the least-liked group 
(Figure 2). Similarly, the LGBT community was identified more than 
the PKI/communists. In the most recent survey, atheists were also men-
tioned by a relatively high number of citizens (11.5%). In the 2010 and 
2013 surveys, opinions on the PKI as the least-liked group declined 
consistently, probably owing to new groups receiving public attention. 
Without the emergence of new groups competing with the PKI, nega-
tive sentiments toward this group continued to decline.
Citizens having opinions on the existence of least-liked groups is 
normal. People are not angels, and admitting that least-liked groups 
exist in society does not automatically show intolerance. However, it 
can be a sign of “potential” for the emergence of political intolerance, 
which can be explored further.
To ascertain whether the opinion that “there is a group in society 
that is least liked” is an intolerant or tolerant political attitude, a series 
of questions are raised to reveal intolerance or tolerance. In this study, 
political tolerance or intolerance is measured by the degree to which 
individuals agree or disagree that an individual from their least-liked 
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group can 1) become a public official or state official, such as the presi-
dent, a governor, a regent, a member of parliament (national and local), 
a village chief, and other positions; 2) teach or become a teacher in a 
state school; and 3) hold a parade in the neighborhood. These three 
activities are included as citizens’ political rights and related to public 
interest.
Figure 2. Trend of Least-liked Groups in Society (%)
Figure 3 shows the trend of level of tolerance or intolerance of Indone-
sians in 2004–2019. From the series of surveys during that period, the 
number of citizens who disagreed or strongly disagreed against people 
from their least-liked groups becoming public officials, marching in 
surrounding areas, and becoming teachers in public schools was rela-
tively volatile.6 In other words, tendency toward tolerance or intolerance 
fluctuated during that period.
6 Each item in the surveys uses an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 5 (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree). For simplicity, the scores of the three items are summed up and averaged to create a 
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Figure 3. Trend of Political Tolerance (%)
In 2004 and 2007, the tolerance percentage was only 16.6% and 11%, re-
spectively. In 2010, the percentage increased significantly to 41.1% and 
rose to 48.1% in 2013. In 2017, 2018, and 2019, the percentage dropped 
to 31.6%, 30.7%, and 20.8%, respectively (Figure 3). Although tolerant 
individuals outnumbered intolerant individuals in the past (2010–2013), 
Indonesians can be considered generally intolerant in terms of their 
political life in the long term. Moreover, Indonesia’s political tolerance 
in the period of 2017–2019 experienced a setback after achieving a rela-
tively satisfactory state. Indonesian citizens generally do not tolerate the 
political rights of citizens from least-liked groups. The political rights 
of atheists, communist, or members of the PKI, ISIS, and the LGBT 
community are least recognized.
As stated above, political tolerance is believed to be extremely im-
portant to democracy consolidation. In other words, the more tolerant a 
tolerance index on a scale of 1 to 5 (from very intolerant to very tolerant). To enhance readability, 
the index tolerance trend is divided into three categories: intolerant, with the score below 1.67; 
neutral, with a score between 1.67 and 3.34; and tolerant, with a score of more than 3.34. Thus, 
the percentage of the intolerant, neutral, and tolerant trend is observed. The respondents who 
answered “do not know” are categorized as neutral, and those who answered “there is no group 
that is the least liked” in the beginning are considered “tolerant.”
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citizen, the stronger their preference for democracy, and this preference 
is a measure of democratic consolidation at the level of individual at-
titudes. Conversely, the more intolerant a citizen is, the weaker is their 
preference for democracy. However, is this finding true in Indonesian 
society?
Intolerant Democrat Syndrome
The answers to the question raised above show that this situation is not 
the case. In general, political tolerance and preference for democracy 
are negatively correlated (Table 2). The more tolerant a citizen is, the 
less their preference for democracy is, or the more the preference of a 
citizen for democracy is, the higher their intolerance is. This pattern 
is consistent in the surveys from one time period to another (Table 2). 
Although the negative correlation between the two concepts is not 
statistically significant initially (2004–2007), it later becomes very sig-
nificant (p < 0.001). Based on the combined analysis of the pooled data, 
in general, the correlation between political tolerance and preference 
for democracy is negative and statistically significant (Table 2).
Table 2. Preference for Democracy and Political Tolerance (Pearson Correlation)
Survey Correlation Sig. N
2004 –0.047 0.110 1,183
2007 –0.044 0.126 1,240
2010 –0.110 0.000 1,320
2013 –0.090 0.002 1,220
2017 –0.095 0.000 1,556
2018 –0.147 0.000 2,119
2019 –0.096 0.000 2,285
Combined 2004–2019 –0.119 0.000 10,923
If preference for democracy over another system that can be considered 
an autocracy is linked to tolerance versus intolerance and neutrality, 
four types of Indonesian citizens emerge, that is, tolerant democrats, 
intolerant democrats, tolerant autocrats, and intolerant autocrats (Table 
3). Tolerant democrats are citizens who prefer democracy and are toler-
ant or allow members of their least-liked groups to have political rights 
as citizens. Meanwhile, intolerant democrats are citizens who prefer 
democracy but are intolerant in their political life. Furthermore, toler-
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ant autocrats are citizens who prefer autocracy but are tolerant in terms 
of their political life. The last type, that is, intolerant autocrats, prefer 
autocracy and are intolerant. These last two types are relatively small 
in number.
Table 3. Typology of Citizens Based on Preference for 
Government System and Political Tolerance
       System of 
government
Political tolerance
Democracy Autocracy
Tolerant Tolerant democrats Tolerant autocrats
Intolerant/neutral Intolerant democrats Intolerant autocrats
Tolerant democrats are generally fewer in number than intolerant 
democrats. Despite fluctuating tendencies, the percentage of tolerant 
democrats is consistently lower than that of intolerant democrats (Figure 
4). The number of tolerant democrats increased in 2010 and 2013 but 
decreased subsequently. This pattern of fluctuation is consistent with 
the fluctuations in the proportion of political tolerance in general and 
with the pattern of fluctuations in the existence of least-liked groups 
in society, as stated above.
From the observations of nearly 15 years, this study determines that 
Indonesian citizens generally prefer democracy as the best system of 
government. This preference tends to increase yearly. Conversely, sup-
port for other systems of government that are not a democracy, authori-
tarian, or an autocracy and citizens who do not value the importance 
of differences between a democracy and other forms of government are 
relatively few. This tendency is decreasing and illustrates that at the level 
of citizens’ attitudes, Indonesian democracy is consolidated.
However, the consolidation of democracy at this attitudinal level is 
threatened by political tolerance. Using a highly inclusive approach to 
observe political tolerance, this study finds that Indonesian citizens are 
generally intolerant. In 2010-2013 tolerant people outnumber intoler-
ant people, but decline sharply to intolerance in further developments.
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Figure 4. Trend of types of citizens (%)
In Indonesia, during the study period, preference for democracy was 
not parallel with political tolerance. Preference for democracy tended 
to be high and increasing, whereas political tolerance was low and fluc-
tuating. After further examination, this study determines that political 
tolerance generally has a negative correlation with democratic consoli-
dation at the attitudinal level (Table 2). The relationship between the 
two concepts results in a phenomenon that the author calls “intolerant 
democrat syndrome.” The syndrome describes the proportion of citi-
zens with the highest preference for democracy but unaccompanied by 
political tolerance. Moreover, political tolerance weakens preference 
for democracy and vice versa; specifically, preference for democracy 
weakens political tolerance. This syndrome is a political complication 
at the citizen level. The implication of this phenomenon is that despite 
Indonesia’s implementation of democracy, it likely cannot be improved 
or significantly consolidated owing to obstacles to political tolerance.
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DISCUSSION
The findings of this study confirm the assessment or rating of the state 
of Indonesian democracy, which is regularly carried out by the Free-
dom House, using different methods. The Freedom House relies on 
the assessments of a number of experts or well-informed individuals 
on Indonesian politics, whereas this article relies on public opinions, 
which are commonly used in studies on the state of democracy and 
political tolerance in the world, such as the World Value Survey, the 
Latinobarómetro, the Afrobarometer, the Arab Barometer, and the 
Asian Barometer Survey.
The Freedom House believes that Indonesia made significant prog-
ress in terms of freedom, which is the basic concept of democracy, from 
being “not free” before the reformation to “partly free” in the early 
reformation period (1999–2005) to “free” in the period of 2006–2013 
but suffered a setback by returning to being “partially free” subsequently 
(Freedom House 2020). This pattern is highly consistent with the find-
ings of this study.
A number of other studies present a similar interpretation that In-
donesian democracy declined at least in the last five years (Hadiz 2017; 
Menchik 2019; Warburton and Aspinall 2019; Aspinall et al. 2020; Mi-
etzner 2020). The reasons for this decline are related to the issue of civil 
liberties or tolerance and pluralism. This study systematically confirms 
the problem of weak political tolerance using a new approach that is 
not biased against certain groups.
Moreover, the main contribution of this study is the finding of the 
intolerant democrat syndrome, which indicates that citizens’ preference 
for democracy is not accompanied by political tolerance and that politi-
cal tolerance weakens preference for democracy, and vice versa. This 
syndrome is a type of complication that can hinder Indonesian democ-
racy from becoming truly consolidated.
Further systematic study is necessary to find the source of this in-
tolerant democrat syndrome. Similar to the case of tolerance in numer-
ous Western European countries and in Russia, least-liked groups with 
deep historical roots exist in society. In the case of Western Europe, 
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citizens who consider the Nazis as their least-liked group in society 
do not tolerate people affiliated with Nazis having political rights as 
citizens, and those who are intolerant demonstrate a preference for 
democracy or positive attitudes toward the value of democracy (Duch 
and Gibson 1992). In other words, tolerance weakens democracy. This 
negative relationship pattern increased owing to the Nazi’s long and 
negative history in Western Europe. Western European democrats are 
politically intolerant when the targets of tolerance are the Nazis and 
other right-wing extremists.
Similar symptoms can be observed in Russia (Gibson 1998). In this 
country, communism has a deep history and ended with the angry atti-
tudes and behaviors of the citizens toward the ideology. In the transpar-
ent era, with the collapse of communism in the country, people devel-
oped deep negative impressions on the communist regime. Therefore, 
it was not tolerated. Russian citizens who support democracy do not 
tolerate the political rights of citizens affiliated with communist groups 
or those with communist ideals. Owing to this situation, tolerance in 
the country does not strengthen its democracy.
The emergence of the intolerant democrat syndrome phenomenon 
in Indonesia is similar to the situation that occurred in Western Europe 
and Russia. Groups in the community widely cited as the least-liked 
groups are the PKI, atheists, ISIS, and the LGBT community.
The PKI or communists in Indonesia have a long and deep his-
tory. Similar to the Nazis in Europe and communists in Russia, the 
communist party in Indonesia ceased with conflict and violence at 
the expense of numerous people from both sides. Moreover, the PKI 
became an illegal party, and communism was officially banned by the 
state. The Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly Decree, which 
banned the PKI and its associated ideology, remains valid and serves as 
the legal basis for the prohibition of the ideology or activities supporting 
or sympathizing with the PKI.7 The constitutional basis for banning 
communism in Indonesia is also contained in the current State Consti-
7 For studies on the PKI or communists in Indonesia, see Mortimer (2006). https://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-indonesia-communism-idUKKBN1FD18H.
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tution, which is the result of amendments during the reformation era 
(Vebriyanto 2020). The PKI is also used as a political instrument for 
mass mobilization and to obtain sympathy from the masses, many of 
whom are believed to be anticommunist (Lamb 2017).
Indonesian citizens who prefer or support democracy do not nec-
essarily have to tolerate communist groups or ideologies because this 
group has a long history and has been stigmatized through the years. 
Many Indonesians likely believe that communists and their ideologies 
should not exist in Indonesia. Communists having political rights is not 
tolerated. In society, believing that everyone has the right to compete 
for mass support regardless of their political beliefs, including commu-
nism, is rare. A general judgment that communists and other least-liked 
groups should be outside the arena of competition exists. Indonesian 
democrats might be tolerant if the target of tolerance is not individuals 
with communist backgrounds or least-liked groups.
Communism or the PKI is a leftist ideology or political group. By 
contrast, a political group with right-wing ideologies is ISIS.8 Since its 
emergence in the Middle East in 2014, many Indonesians have become 
aware of ISIS through mass media. Some Indonesians sympathize with 
and have joined this political movement by going to Syria (Rizki 2018). 
However, Indonesians generally do not sympathize with ISIS, and many 
identify it as their least-liked group.
Ideas and movements such as ISIS are not new in Indonesian history. 
Before the emergence of ISIS, groups and movements sharing similar 
aspirations existed in Indonesian society, which led to the establishment 
of an Islamic state. Several such groups fought to be recognized through 
violent means. An example of such groups is the Darul Islam (“Islamic 
state”) or DI/Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII), which evolved into the 
Negara Islam Indonesia or Islamic State of Indonesia (NII.9 At present, 
certain people still support the DI/TII (Mappapa 2019).
8 See Gerges (2016) and Byrd (2017) for a summary and review of numerous important works 
on ISIS.
9 For additional information on the DI /TII, see van Dijk (1981).
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Although the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia HTI does not identify itself 
with the DI/TII or ISIS, it has similar aims, including the establishment 
of an Islamic state (khilafah) and a society based on Sharia law. The 
HTI is also an ideology and movement that originated in the Middle 
East, similar to ISIS. Following the fate of the DI/TII, HTI is now of-
ficially banned in Indonesia (Rizqa 2017).
Although it has the same ideals as ISIS and has existed in Indonesia 
for a long time, the DI/TII is not widely identified as a least-liked group 
in society, and its percentage is far below that of the PKI and ISIS. This 
finding may be observed because the group has been banned and thus 
has become part of history. The HTI is also not widely identified as a 
most-disliked group compared with ISIS perhaps because it is known as 
a peaceful political movement despite its aspirations to establish a kh-
ilafah or an Islamic state, similar to ISIS. Meanwhile, ISIS is a political 
group and movement that uses violence and wages wars and reported 
on a massive scale by mass media. Such characteristics are a source of 
increased negative attitudes toward ISIS. 
The LGBT community should be highlighted. Why is the LGBT 
community one of the least-liked groups in society, and why do citizens 
not tolerate the political rights of individuals associated with this group? 
A specific study on this problem is necessary.10 The term “LGBT” is 
widely used and has received attention since 2016 (Wijaya 2020). No 
historical record exists stating that the LGBT community is a physical 
threat to people and the country. Conversely, the LGBT community has 
been increasingly accepted by the global community, and the political 
rights of its members have been increasingly recognized. The PKI, ISIS, 
or other extreme right-wing organizations might be perceived as physi-
cally and politically threatening; however, this perception may not be 
the case with the LGBT community. Hypothetically, intolerance of the 
political rights of citizens with LGBT backgrounds comes from tradi-
tions or values  found in society. These values  may derive from religion 
or the dominant interpretation of Indonesian laws and the constitution 
(Iskandar 2016; Sujana, Setyawati, and Ujanti 2018; Wijaya 2020).
10 Regarding LGBT communities in Indonesia, see, for example, Wijaya (2020).
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The PKI and ISIS are groups that are not accommodated by the 
Indonesian constitution. Moreover, the Pancasila and amended 1945 
Constitution do not accommodate ideologies and groups such as the 
PKI and ISIS, as both are considered unconstitutional. The constitu-
tional framework introduced in society systematically shapes citizens’ 
political attitudes and determines which sociopolitical groups are ac-
ceptable or unacceptable, and whether their political rights should be 
recognized (Menchik 2014; Iskandar 2016). Further research on the 
importance of the constitutional framework in shaping the political 
attitudes and tolerance of citizens toward least-liked groups, such as 
the PKI and ISIS, is necessary. From an institutional perspective, in-
stitutions such as the constitution are crucial in shaping the political 
processes, results, attitudes, and behaviors of citizens (North and Wein-
gast 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996). The Indonesian constitution can also 
be a source of discrimination against the LGBT community because 
the constitution requires citizens to believe in one God, whereas the 
behaviors of members of the LGBT community can be interpreted as 
contrary to religious norms and beliefs. In other words, the dominant 
understanding of religion is likely a source of discrimination against 
the LGBT community, and this understanding is sought for its legiti-
macy in the Indonesian constitution to claim anti-LGBT sentiments 
as constitutional.
Officially, Indonesia embraces democracy. The Indonesian consti-
tution also serves as the foundation for the existence of Indonesian 
democracy and its functions. This idea is why democracy is generally 
considered positive, normatively justified, and has become the people’s 
preference. However, the constitution does not accommodate and toler-
ate and prohibits certain ideologies and/or groups in society, such as the 
PKI, ISIS, atheists, and the LGBT community. The constitution shapes 
the type of democracy adopted in Indonesia, which is a democracy 
that is not adequately inclusive of all groups in society (Iskandar 2016). 
Nevertheless, a view exists that the constitution forms tolerant attitudes 
and behaviors to a certain degree (Ramage 1995; Ellison 2010; Sujana, 
Setyawati, and Ujanti 2018; Menchik 2019). Owing to this view, the 
31INTOLERANT DEMOCRAT SYNDROME
relationship between the constitution and political tolerance is incon-
clusive and requires further research.
CONCLUSION
Numerous studies suggest that Indonesian democracy is experiencing a 
decline. One reason for this setback is the lack of development of plural-
ism and political tolerance among the elite and the masses. Is it true 
that Indonesian citizens are politically intolerant and ultimately hinder 
the development of Indonesian democracy? This study addresses this 
problem systematically with a political tolerance approach and mea-
surement that are not biased against certain sociopolitical groups. The 
results generally describe a condition of political tolerance in Indone-
sian society for a relatively long period, that is, 2004–2019. This study 
determines that Indonesian citizens are generally politically intolerant.
Another contribution of this study is the discovery of the symptoms 
of the intolerant democrat syndrome in most citizens. Citizens prefer 
democracy over other forms of government but are politically intolerant. 
This pattern refutes the findings of many studies that political toler-
ance strengthens democracy. The existence of the intolerant democrat 
syndrome is evidence against this finding. This syndrome is a political 
complication in society that makes the consolidation of Indonesian 
democracy difficult. Thus, the main source of this complication should 
be explored further. One possibility that must be tested is that the In-
donesian constitution is a source of the emergence of the intolerant 
democratic syndrome because it accommodates and legitimizes democ-
racy for Indonesia but is not adequately inclusive to accommodate the 
diversity of interest groups in society. As a result, political tolerance can-
not grow properly to encourage a consolidated Indonesian democracy.
A PPENDI X: METHODS A ND DATA
This study relies on public opinion surveys, which are commonly used 
in many studies on democratic consolidation at the attitudinal level 
and political tolerance. In the period of 2004–2019, a series of national 
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surveys were conducted with a sample population of Indonesian citizens 
aged 17 years and over or married.
To obtain representative samples of the characteristics of the Indo-
nesian population, complex sampling techniques are used based on a 
combination of strata and clusters. For this reason, the national popula-
tion is first stratified by province, area (rural or urban), and gender to 
make the sample varied and close to the population characteristics. At 
the same time, population clustering is performed to make this survey 
efficient. The first cluster is the village/subdistrict, the second cluster 
is the Rukun Tetangga (RT), and the third cluster is the family card 
(KK). The four respondents in the KK are chosen using the Kish grid.
After the number of respondents in one survey is determined (in this 
study, this number varies between 1,200 and 2,400), respondents from 
every province are randomly selected according to the population of 
each province. Given that the village is used as the primary sampling 
unit in each survey and 10 respondents are interviewed in each village, 
the number of villages in each province is randomly selected based 
on the number of respondents selected. As West Java has the largest 
population in the country, the number of respondents from West Java 
is the highest. By contrast, the population of West Papua, or then North 
Kalimantan, is the lowest; thus, the number of respondents from this 
province is also the fewest, and so on.
After one village/subdistrict in a province is chosen randomly, an 
RT list is made for that village, and five RTs are chosen randomly. All 
the households in the selected RTs are listed; two households are then 
chosen randomly. In the chosen KK, one person is selected using a 
male Kish grid or meeting to be interviewed. The response rate for 
each survey varies but is as low as 81.6%.
The interviews are conducted by trained interviewers. An interviewer 
is responsible for questioning 10 respondents. Each interviewer is super-
vised by a regional coordinator, with spot checks conducted for 20% of 
the total number of respondents and telephone checks conducted for 
50% to ensure that the interviews are conducted according to standard 
operating procedures. The 2004–2010 survey was conducted by Lem-
33INTOLERANT DEMOCRAT SYNDROME
baga Survei Indonesia, and the 2013–2019 survey was conducted by 
Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting.
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